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Overregulation or Fair Interpretation: Christopher v. SmithKline and the Question of 
Judicial Deference in Department of Labor Rulemaking 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 American jobs are remarkably different from what they were 30 years ago.  Many of 
today’s employees use technology that allows them to be constantly connected to their jobs, and 
many have jobs requiring them to work outside of the traditional scheme of clocking in and 
clocking out of work each day.  While the American workplace has evolved in many ways since 
the passage of the primary federal statutes that protect American workers, many of those statutes 
and the regulations that implement them have made considerably less progress.
1
  For example, 
the vast majority of American workers have enjoyed the protections of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA)
2
 since 1938.  The FLSA guarantees two of the most important employment 
conditions for most workers – a minimum wage and overtime pay for any hours worked in 
excess of 40 hours each week.
3
  Even though the FLSA deals almost exclusively with these two 
very basic and widely accepted controls on the employment relationship, the law has become one 
of the most complex and hotly debated areas of employment litigation over the last several years 
because of uncertainty about the scope of the Act’s coverage as it relates to modern workplaces.  
 Some of these uncertainties arise when employers seek to avoid their wage and hour 
obligations by fitting their employees into one of the hundreds of FLSA exemptions, which 
include jobs from commercial fishermen to computer professionals.  However, many jobs simply 
cannot be fitted into these exemptions, the vast majority of which were enacted in response to the 
concerns of employers who operated under workplace dynamics that are markedly different from 
                                                 
1
 Robert D. Lipman et. al., A Call for Bright-Lines to Fix the Fair Labor Standards Act, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 357, 
361 (1994). 
2
 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
3
 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. 
 2 
those that exist today.
4
  As a result, the FLSA has become a minefield of litigation for employers 
and a source of confusion for employers and employees alike.  Unfortunately, the Department of 
Labor (DOL), the federal agency charged with interpreting and enforcing the FLSA, has 
struggled to adequately resolve many of these problems. 
 One of the major driving forces behind FLSA litigation of the last few years is the issue 
how much judicial deference the DOL should receive for its “opinion letters” – the DOL’s 
primary method of providing comprehensive guidance and compliance assistance to employers 
and employees covered by the FLSA.  The opinion letter has been both a blessing and a curse for 
the DOL, which is largely a function of the fact that the opinion letter provides guidance on the 
meaning and interpretation of FLSA regulations on an individual, fact-dependent basis.  A lack 
of broad, independent interpretive authority is just one of the many structural obstacles faced by 
the DOL, but it is an obstacle that appeared to be shrinking over the last few decades because of 
the high level of judicial deference granted to agency’s interpretations of their own regulations.  
In fact, the DOL began to use judicial deference as a tool to advance its regulatory interpretations 
through amicus briefs.  However, this chapter in judicial deference may be at an end.  From the 
definition of “changing clothes” at the beginning and end of every workday to the definition of 
an “outside salesman,” employers and courts alike have been waging a new war against the DOL 
and its use of opinion letters and amicus briefs to interpret key exemptions contained in the 
FLSA. The DOL has never before faced such an intense period of employer animosity and 
judicial antagonism toward the use of opinion letters to revise its prior interpretations of the 
FLSA, and in some cases, to completely overturn its prior positions.   
                                                 
4
 See WILLIS J. NORDLUND, THE QUEST FOR A LIVING WAGE: THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE 
PROGRAM 45 (1997). 
 3 
 In a recent case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Christopher v. SmithKline,
5
 the 
United States Supreme Court had a chance to review a controversial opinion letter issued by the 
DOL concerning multiple pharmaceutical companies that had attempted to classify their sales 
representatives as “outside salesmen,” a category of workers excused from both the wage and 
hour requirements of the FLSA. The Court chose to give almost no deference to the DOL’s 
interpretation as articulated in its amicus brief, instead choosing to perform its own detailed 
analysis of the meaning of the term “outside salesman” and whether pharmaceutical marketing 
representatives fit within this narrow exemption.  The Supreme Court concluded that the DOL’s 
interpretation did not deserve deference because of the “unfair surprise” such deference would 
create for the multiple pharmaceutical companies who had been treating their sales 
representatives as “outside salesmen” for years without any objection from the DOL.   
 In this article, I will illustrate some of the most challenging aspects of litigating FLSA 
exemption cases given the inability of FLSA regulations to keep up with the pace of change in 
American workplaces.  I will use the facts of SmithKline as an example of the tactical and legal 
issues faced by wage and hour attorneys in exemption cases, and I will demonstrate how 
SmithKline itself has only added to the unpredictability of these cases.  Section I will discuss the 
history of the FLSA, its major amendments, and recent rulemaking surrounding one of the most 
outdated FLSA exemptions – the in-home care worker exemption.  Section II will describe the 
methods by which the DOL interprets the FLSA and issues guidance to employers, and it will 
trace the evolution of the various doctrines of judicial deference that apply to such 
interpretations.  Section III will present the Court’s decision in Christopher v. SmithKline, 
viewed in the context of the Court’s apparent disdain for the Obama administration’s use of a 
DOL amicus program to announce and revise its interpretations of many FLSA provisions.  
                                                 
5
 132 S.Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 4 
Section IV will discuss the recent debate surrounding employers’ claims that the DOL has been 
“over” regulating the FLSA, particularly through its use of opinion letters and amicus briefs to 
interpret many of the FLSA’s complicated provisions.  The section will discuss the implications 
of SmithKline for other cases involving the proper classification of exempt workers, and it will 
also consider the impact of a larger political context involving presidential influence over the 
DOL’s rulemaking and interpretive agenda.  Section V will offer solutions attorneys who must 
litigate FLSA exemption cases without answers to some of the questions left open by 
SmithKline.  As an alternative to piecemeal opinion letters and amicus briefs, this article will 
propose a DOL policy of notice and comment rulemaking and more formal guidance, including 
improved Administrator Interpretations, as the most appropriate method for ensuring that future 
DOL interpretations are entitled to deference.  
I. A Brief History of the FLSA and Judicial Deference to DOL Interpretation 
 The FLSA is one of the most basic and enduring employment protections in American 
history.  While the basic goal of the FLSA – giving all workers a livable wage – may seem quite 
simple and socially desirable, it took a grueling Congressional battle for the FLSA to become 
federal law.
6
 The FLSA is also a statute that has seen a number of Congressional amendments 
over the years that have both expanded and restricted its coverage in certain industries and its 
protections of certain categories of employees, and it is still changing today. 
A. The Spirit and Purpose of the FLSA and its Early Exemptions 
 Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to address the substandard wages that President 
Roosevelt and his advisers believed had “sparked and prolonged the Depression.”
7
 The text of 
the statute itself stated that the statute was intended to address “labor conditions detrimental to 
                                                 
6
 NORDLUND, supra note 4, at 45-52. 
7
 Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 22 
(2000). 
 5 
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general 
well-being of workers.”
8
 Given these concerns, Congress sought to use the FLSA as a tool to 
ensure fair competition in American markets as well as to permanently resolve the devastating 
effects of the Depression on the average American worker.
9
  The FLSA sets a uniform national 
floor for hourly wages, and it also requires that employees be paid time and a half for any hours 
they worked over forty each week.
10
 Throughout the Depression, employers who were strapped 
for cash simply chose to retain fewer employees while forcing their remaining employees to 
work longer hours.
11
  “One of the most important purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act was 
to reduce the large volume of unemployment by discouraging overtime, thereby providing an 
incentive for employers to hire additional workers.”
12
   
 While the wage and hour provisions worked in tandem for most employees covered by 
the FLSA, there were notable exemptions from one or both of the statute’s main protections.  
Among those groups of employees who were exempt from both the wage and hour provisions 
under the original 1938 statute were executive, administrative and professional employees, 
employees of local retailers, outside salesmen, seamen, most employees of commercial fishing 
companies, and all agricultural employees, among others.
13
  Some of these exemptions were a 
function of the Roosevelt administration’s goal of ensuring that the FLSA would not be the kind 
of “intrastate” regulation that was struck down in Schechter Poultry v. United States
14
 throughout 
                                                 
8
 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
9
 Harris, supra note 8, at 22. 
10
 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 
11
 NORDLUND, supra note 4, at 34. 
12
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISIONS, ANNUAL REPORT (1940) at 
X. 
13
 NORDLUND, supra note 4, at 51. 
14
 295 U.S. 495 (1935)(holding that the federal government may only regulate businesses that have a direct effect on 




  The president also had to manage the demands of southern congressmen who 
refused to vote for a minimum wage statute unless it incorporated exemptions that would protect 
the agriculturally-based southern economy that depended on the exploitation of black labor.
16
   
 Many of these exemptions were also the result of lobbying by both employers and labor 
unions alike who sought to control some of the unknowns about the effect the law would have on 
free enterprise and employee bargaining power.
17
  Employers themselves were mostly 
ambivalent to the FLSA, but their lobbying associations mounted a persistent opposition to the 
enactment of the statute. Organizations including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National 
Industrial Conference Board, and the National Restaurant Association maintained “rigid 
opposition” to any federal minimum wage law.
18
  Many labor unions, including the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Committee on Industrial Organizations (CIO), were 
apprehensive about federal minimum wage legislation, not only because it impinged on the 
territory of the unions, but also because of the fear that the minimum wage floor would become a 
maximum wage.
19
  The final version of the FLSA, as signed by President Roosevelt, was a 
compromise among members of Congress, employers, the AFL and CIO, and President 
Roosevelt incorporating exemptions and other mechanisms designed to make the transition to a 
minimum wage, maximum hour regime as smooth as possible for all parts of the country.
20
 
B. Major Amendments to the FLSA 
 The FLSA was a landmark piece of employment legislation, but it was not without its 
flaws and ambiguities.  The U.S. Supreme Court was left to resolve early issues of interpreting 
                                                 
15
 Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal 65 TEX. 
L. REV. 1335, 1372 (1987). 
16
 Linder, supra note 6, at 1342-43. 
17
 NORDLUND, supra note 4, at 51. 
18
 Id. at 44. 
19
 Id.  at 34-35; Harris, supra note 8, at 22. 
20
 NORDLUND, supra note 4, at 51. 
 7 
the FLSA.  One of the Court’s early decisions, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery, Co.,
21
 
illustrated to Congress that it could not leave too many of the FLSA’s gaps open to Supreme 
Court interpretation if it wanted to guarantee that employers would not be subject to massive 
waves of retroactive FLSA litigation.
22
  This led to the first major restriction of the FLSA’s 
coverage, the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947.
23
  Despite many of the initial problems with the 
enforcement and interpretation of the law, both the DOL and Congress recognized the need to 
bring more industries and employees under the protection of the FLSA, largely under the 
influence of lobbying by unions and employees.
24
  However, this expansion of coverage was 
accompanied by a corresponding restriction in many other industries in which employers 
persuaded Congress the wage and hour provisions would put them out of business entirely.
25
  
1. The Portal to Portal Act  
One of the FLSA’s major gaps is that it does not define “work” or “workweek.” As such, the 
Supreme Court had to develop its own definitions of these terms to assist in its early 
interpretation of the statute.
26
  The Court’s first attempt at defining “work” came in 1944 in 
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,
27
 holding that time miners spent 
traveling down into the mine qualified as “work” under the FLSA.
28
  The Court again defined 
“work” and “workweek” broadly in Anderson by holding that the “workweek” included “all time 
during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's premises, on duty or at 
                                                 
21 
328 U.S. 680 (1946)(holding that employers had to pay employees for all time they were required to be at the 
workplace, including time spent turning on lights and machines each morning.) 
22
 Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 
71-72 (1991). 
23
 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62 (2011). 
24
 Jonathan Fox Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Comparative Analysis of the National Labor Relations Act and 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Hope for the NLRA's Future, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 107, 124-25 (2009). 
25
 Lipman et al., supra note 1, at 363-64. 
26
 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (“[W]e are not guided by 
any precise statutory definition of work or employment.”). 
27 
321 U.S. 590, 591–92 (1944). 
28





  The Court also held that preliminary activities done solely on the 
employer’s premises that are a “necessary prerequisite to productive work” also constitute work 
for purposes of the FLSA.
30
  These preliminary activities could include tasks such as putting on 
aprons or overalls, turning on machines, and sharpening tools.
31
  
In 1947, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act
32
 as a direct legislative response to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Anderson and subsequent cases applying its reasoning, which 
Congress viewed as interpreting the FLSA in a way that disregarded “long-established customs, 
practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected 
liabilities” that would “bring about the financial ruin of many employers.”
33
 The Portal-to-Portal 
Act provides, among other things, that employers cannot be liable under the FLSA for not 
compensating employees for “preliminary” or “postliminary” activities done before or after the 
employee’s actual workday.
34
    
The Portal-to-Portal Act is a fascinating legislative response by Congress.  Congress faced 
huge amounts of pressure from both private employers and the U.S. Treasury to effectively 
override the Supreme Court.
35
 The Act was a clear signal to employers that Congress was willing 
to listen to their pleas about how and when the FLSA should apply to their workers, and it set a 
precedent for the extensive amendments that Congress would make to the FLSA over the next 
few decades in response to employer arguments about the damage the wage and hour 
requirements would have on a particular industry.  
 
                                                 
29
 Id. at 690–91(emphasis added). 
30 
Id. at 693. 
31
 Id. at 692–93. 
32 
29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62 (2011). 
33
 Id. at § 251(a). 
34
 Id. at § 254(a). 
35
 Linder, supra note 23 at 132, 135. 
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2. The Removal and Addition of Industry-Specific Exemptions  
 Congress made its first substantive amendments to the FLSA in 1949, eleven years after 
the statute was passed.
36
 The 1949 amendments attempted to clarify some of the more 
ambiguous portions of the statute in addition to both expanding and restricting coverage for 
specific industries.
37
  The amendments extended coverage to workers in industries that were not 
previously subject to the FLSA’ provisions, including airline employees and employees at fish 
and seafood canneries.
38
  However, the amendments also restricted coverage for certain 
industries by creating exemptions for certain telegraph agencies, logging and forestry operations 
with fewer than twelve employees, taxi drivers, learners, apprentices.
39
 Perhaps one of the most 
shocking exemptions, and one that stands in stark contrast to the principles of Americans with 
Disabilities Act, is an exemption for disabled workers.
40
 
 Lobbyists from various industries have had success convincing Congress to exempt their 
employees from both the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions by arguing that the 
standard would drive up prices and damage the economic viability of American fisheries, 
logging operations, bulk petroleum distribution, and local news media, including newspapers and 
broadcast stations.
41
 There is little evidence to explain why Congress chose to create exemptions 
for these industries and not for others, outside of the individual persuasive power of lobbyists.
42
    
 Many of the FLSA’s original exemptions have been repealed by subsequent amendments, 
including those in 1966, which brought nursing homes, laundries, and the entire construction 
industry under the FLSA’s coverage, and those in 1977, which eliminated the overtime 
                                                 
36
 NORDLUND, supra note 4, at 76. 
37
 Id.  Congress likely included this exemption with the thinking that employers would not hire disabled workers at 
the minimum wage rate. 
38
 Id. at 76-77.  
39
 Id. at 77. 
40
 Id.  
41
 Lipman et al., supra note 1 at 363-64. 
42
 Id.  
 10 
exemption for hotel, motel, and restaurant workers.
43
 However, some of the exemptions that 
remain no longer serve the purposes for which they were enacted.  To this day, not all 
agricultural workers are covered by the wage and hour provisions FLSA,
44
 despite the fact that 
the vast majority of these workers are immigrants who work long hours for extremely low 
wages.
45
 Some workers are covered by the FLSA’s minimum wage requirement only, meaning 
their employers do not have to pay them for overtime.
46





 “any employee engaged in the processing of maple sap into sugar 
(other than refined sugar) or syrup,”
49
and “any individual employed as an outside buyer of 
poultry, eggs, cream, or milk, in their raw or natural state.”  
 These are just a few examples illustrating that most FLSA exemptions were not drafted in 
a way that captures the current realities of the modern American workplace and its 
demographics, which can lead to irrational outcomes when applied to today’s workers.
50
 In fact, 
FLSA exemptions are so complicated and confusing that Thompson Publishing Group produces 
a monthly newsletter to inform employees of their rights under the FLSA and alert them to the 
ways in which their employers might be misinterpreting the law.
51
  Thompson also produces a 
similar newsletter geared toward employers, in addition to numerous handbooks and guides that 
describe the intricacies and pitfalls of FLSA exemptions.
52
  
3. Change On the Horizon 
                                                 
43
History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm. 
44
 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6). 
45
 Lipman et al., supra note 1, at 360. 
46
 See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (listing exemptions from §207, the maximum hour provision of the FLSA). 
47
 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(5). 
48
 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(27). 
49
 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(15). 
50
 Id.  
51
 See, e.g., Taking a Poll: How Much Do You Know About Voting Leave, 18 No. 2 FLSA EMP. EXEMPTION 
HANDBOOK NEWSL. 1 (Oct. 2012). 
52
 See, e.g., Schlomo Katz, To Clock or Not to Clock?, 20 No. 3 EMPLOYER'S GUIDE FAIR LAB. STANDARDS ACT 
NEWSL. 1 (Oct. 2012).  
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 While it is largely true that the FLSA and its exemptions have failed to keep up with the 
realities of the modern workplace, there appears to have been one recent success. In December 
2011, President Barack Obama proposed a revision of the FLSA that would extend overtime 
coverage to home-care workers, many of whom take care of the elderly in their own homes.
53
 
The DOL conducted an extended comment period, and it is currently deciding on a final rule.
54
 
Home health care is the second-fastest-growing job category in the country with a work force of 
about 2.5 million, and two-thirds of home care workers would be affected by a rule extending 
overtime protection.
55
  The proposed rule recognizes that women, immigrants and service 
workers are an extremely important component of the modern workforce, and it attempts to 
interpret the FLSA in such a way that will allow these workers to receive appropriate 
compensation for all of the hours they work. 
 This proposed rulemaking is a stark example of the ways in which the FLSA simply does 
not meet the needs of the modern workplace.  While the DOL and the President recognize this 
fact, notice and comment rulemaking is a cumbersome tool
56
 for the task of ensuring that the 
FLSA and its maze of exemptions are being applied in a way that considers both the intent of the 
exemptions and the practical effect that those exemptions have on today’s employees.  
Unfortunately, the DOL does not have the resources to conduct this kind of notice and comment 
rulemaking for every situation in which the FLSA has gaps or ambiguous exemptions. As an 
alternative, the DOL relies on judicial deference to its own interpretations of the FLSA and its 
regulations, which it bases on its own knowledge and experience with the application of the law.    
                                                 
53
 Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Homecare Workers Aren’t Just ‘Companions,’ NY TIMES (July 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/opinion/fairness-for-home-care-workers.html. 
54
 Id.  
55
 Id.  
56
 Notice and comment rulemaking is inherently time consuming, costing agencies money and other resources to 
draft notices of proposed rulemaking, review all submitting comments, and incorporate comments into final rules. 
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II. History of Deference to Agency Interpretation 
 The steady growth of the federal administrative state throughout the twentieth century 
introduced numerous legal issues for the federal courts, including the extent to which the courts 
should give deference to agency interpretations of both federal laws enacted by Congress and 
federal regulations promulgated by the agencies themselves.
57
  The United States Supreme Court 
has grappled with the complex issue of agency deference on many occasions, and the evolution 
of its deference doctrines indicate a general trend toward a higher level of deference for agencies 
when they are interpreting both their enabling statutes and their own regulations.
58
 
A. Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Statutes 
 In 1944, the Court established what today might be considered a fairly low baseline for 
judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
59
 affording 
deference to an agency’s interpretation according to the agency’s “power to persuade.”
60
 Such 
persuasive power depends upon “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”
61
  Swift employed the 
plaintiffs in Skidmore at one of its meatpacking plants and paid them a weekly salary.
62
  The 
employees worked during the day as well as several nights a week, when they were on call in the 
plant’s “fire hall,” from where they would monitor and respond to any fire alarms.
63
  The 
                                                 
57
 Elbert Lin & Brendan J. Morrissey, Agency Deference After Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 25 No. 11 
ADLAW BULLETIN 1 (Sept. 2012). 
58
 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)(holding that agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions are entitled to significant deference), and Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 462 (1997)(extending mandatory deference absent a plainly erroneous agency interpretation of its own 
regulations to cases where the agency’s interpretation is advanced for the first time “in a legal brief.”).  
59
 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
60
 Id. at 140. 
61
 Id.  
62
 Id. at 135. 
63
 Id.  
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employees were not compensated for this “on call” time.
64
  To resolve the issue of whether the 
employees should be compensated for their “on call” time, the Court consulted an “interpretive 
bulletin” created by the DOL Administrator explaining the DOL’s position as to what activities 
may be counted as working time where an employee is “on call.”
65
  The Court found that the 
Administrator’s bulletin was persuasive under the facts of the case, and it factored the bulletin 
into its decision that some “on call” time can be working time under the FLSA.
66
  Courts relied 
on the Skidmore standard to evaluate agency interpretations of statutes for many years.
67
  
 Forty years after its decision in Skidmore, the Court issued its decision in Chevron U.S.A. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
68
  The Court used Chevron to announce a dramatic 
increase in the amount of deference to be given to an agency’s statutory interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute.
69
 Chevron dealt with the national air quality standards established by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to interpret the amended Clean Air Act.
70
  The Act 
required states to establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary 
sources” of air pollution.
71
 The EPA issued a definition of “stationary source” that allowed states 
to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within one plant “as though they were encased 
within a single ‘bubble.’”
72
 The EPA promulgated this definition using notice and comment 
rulemaking.
73
  The Court concluded this was a reasonable construction of  “stationary source.”
74
 
                                                 
64
 Id.  
65
 Id. at 138-39. 
66
 Id. at 139-140 (1944)(concluding that the Administrator’s bulletin was “made in pursuance of official duty, based 
upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a 
particular case.”) 
67
 Lin & Morrissey, supra note 57, at 2.  
68
 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
69
 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 883 (2001). 
70
 Id. at 839-40. 
71




 Id. at 858-59. 
74
 Id. at 840. 
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 Chevron requires courts to give substantial deference to agency interpretations where the 
statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the 
ambiguity.
75
 Prior to the Court’s decision in Chevron, courts were only required to give 
substantial deference where Congress had expressly delegated authority to an agency “to define a 
statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision.”
76
 However, “[u]nder 
Chevron . . . , if a statute is unambiguous the statute governs; if, however, Congress’ silence or 
ambiguity has ‘left a gap for the agency to fill,’ courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation 
so long as it is a ‘permissible construction of a statute.” 
77
  In other words, a statute must be 
“ambiguous” or silent on the matter at issue in order for an agency’s interpretation of that statute 
to receive substantial deference.  
 The Court’s position on deference to statutory interpretations went through another, more 
confusing transformation in United States v. Mead Corp.
78
  Mead addressed the question of 
whether a U.S. Customs Service ruling letter interpreting the Harmonized Tariff Schedule was 
entitled to Chevron deference.
79
 The ruling letter classified spiral day planners “diaries” that are 
“bound” for tariff purposes, which was a change in the treatment of such planners.
80
 The Court 
concluded that the ruling letter was not entitled to Chevron deference, because it did not possess 
the “force of law” created through rulemaking pursuant to a Congressional delegation of power 
to engage in such rulemaking.
81
  However, the Court noted that ruling letters could still be 
                                                 
75
 J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with A Wink and A Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court 
and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 46 (2010). 
76
 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 883 (2001). 
77
 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993). 
78
 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
79
 Id. at 221. 
80
 Id. at 224-25. 
81
 Id. at 226-27 (noting that “[d]elegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's 
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable 
congressional intent.”) 
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granted Skidmore deference based on their power to persuade.
82
 The Court expressly stated that 
some agency interpretations of statutory provisions, including interpretive rules, informal orders, 
and other pronouncements issued without extensive agency consideration and process are not 
entitled to Chevron deference.
83
  
 The Court’s decision in Mead makes many courts uncomfortable about the proper 
application of Chevron, leading many to apply lower-level Skidmore deference instead of 
Chevron deference where they are unsure whether an agency was appropriately acting under its 
authority to create binding interpretations.
84
 This is known as “Mead-induced Chevron 
avoidance.”
85
  However, other courts apply the considerations introduced in Mead in a much 
different way – by granting Chevron deference to even those agency interpretations that were not 
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication so long as the 
interpretation “foster[s] fairness and deliberation” and “bespeaks the type of legislative activity 
that naturally binds more than the parties to the ruling.”
86
 
 Despite the practical judicial split created by Mead, the Court subsequently reaffirmed its 
approach of applying a very high level of deference to agency interpretations in cases where 
statutory language is truly ambiguous, even where the agency’s interpretation conflicts with that 
of the court.  In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 
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the court reviewed the FCC’s interpretation of the term “telecommunications service,” as 
contained in the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.
 87
  The Court held that the FCC could properly exempt broadband cable modem companies 
from mandatory common-carrier regulations of the Telecommunications Act because the 
services of such companies do not meet its definition for “telecommunication service.”
88
 The 
Court upheld the FCC’s interpretation of “telecommunication service” despite the fact that the 
Ninth Circuit had previously held that the definition could be read to include cable modem 
services.
89
  In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that “a court's prior judicial construction 
of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the 
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”
90
  The Court held “telecommunications service” 
to be an ambiguous term to which the court should grant Chevron deference.
91
  Brand X has been 
argued to support the contention that the Court was still embracing a broad approach to 
substantial deference for agency interpretations of statutes as of 2005. 
B. Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations  
 The Court developed a separate deference doctrine for agency interpretations of agency 
regulations starting with its decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.
92
 In Seminole Rock, 
a manufacturer of crushed stone challenged a price regulation issued by the Administrator of the 
Office of Price Administration setting the maximum price for crushed stone 60 cents per ton.
93
  
This price was based on the Administrator’s interpretation of the phrase “highest price charged 
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during March 1942,” which was the controlling level for a general price freeze applied to many 
products by the Administrator in 1942 and 1943 to prevent price inflation during World War II.
94
  
The Administrator interpreted this phrase as having three different meanings based on whether a 
particular seller made delivery of a sale of goods during March 1942.
95
  Because Seminole Rock 
made a sale in March 1942 at the delivery price of 60 cents, the Administrator froze Seminole 
Rock’s prices at this amount pursuant to his interpretation.  The Court upheld the 
Administrator’s interpretation of “highest price charged during March 1942,” and concluded that 
courts must give “controlling weight” to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation “unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”
96
   
 The Court expanded the scope of Seminole Rock deference in its decision in Auer v. 
Robbins.
97
 In Auer, the Court evaluated whether the DOL Administrator properly found that 
police sergeants were not exempt under the “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” 
exemption from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA.  DOL regulations interpreting the 
FLSA state that one requirement for exempt status is that an employee earn a specified minimum 
amount on a “salary basis” that is not subject to reduction on the basis of “quality or quantity” of 
work performed.
98
  The DOL Administrator interpreted this provision as requiring that public 
employees not be subject to any kind of disciplinary reduction in their salaries, even if such 
reduction is rarely applied, because such reductions qualify as those made on the basis of 
“quality or quantity” of work performed.
99
  The Court upheld this definition using Chevron 
deference, even though the interpretation of reductions based on the “quality or quantity” of 
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work performed was issued in an amicus brief submitted at the request of the Court rather than 
promulgated using notice and comment rulemaking.
100
  The Court, in a majority opinion drafted 
by Justice Scalia, held that Seminole Rock deference applies even when an Agency’s 
interpretation first emerges “in the form of a legal brief.”
101
 This effectively means that agencies 
can support private litigants whose cases depend on the outcome of a judicial decision on the 
meaning of an agency regulation.
102
 The Court also announced a limitation on deference in Auer 
– an agency may not receive Seminole Rock deference where its interpretation of a regulation is a 
“post hoc rationalization” that is intended “to defend past agency action against attack.”
103
 
 Commentators have argued that the wave of increasing judicial deference that started 
with Chevron “crested” with the Court’s decision in Auer.
104
 Many commentators have also 
argued that Auer deference affords “even greater deference to agency interpretations of their own 
ambiguous regulations than Chevron yields to interpretations of ambiguous statutes.”
105
  Some 
scholars have also dubbed the doctrine “Auer super-deference” because it does not require an 
agency to resolve or analyze any underlying ambiguity in its own regulations before interpreting 
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such regulations, whereas Chevron requires that an agency first demonstrate that a statute is truly 
ambiguous before proceeding with its interpretation of the ambiguity.
106
 
C. The DOL’s Interpretive Methods and “Amicus Program” 
 The uncertainties created by the FLSA are not lost on the DOL, which spends a great deal 
of time and resources attempting to provide guidance on the meaning of the FLSA and its 
accompanying regulations.  The DOL issues what it calls “opinion letters” as its primary method 
of interpretive guidance.
107
  Opinion letters are statements of interpretation made by the 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), the department of the DOL that oversees 
the administration of the FLSA, requiring little to no procedure aside from posting the opinion 
letter for public viewing.
108
  The WHD normally issues opinion letters in response to specific 
factual inquiries by employers or employees who are struggling to make sense of the FLSA.
109
 
However, the DOL’s Office of the Solicitor also issues fact-specific amicus briefs in pending 
FLSA litigation.
110
  These amicus briefs serve the same interpretive function as opinion letters, 
particularly where the DOL announces its interpretation on an issue for the first time in an 
amicus brief.  If the courts adopt the interpretation of a FLSA regulation as articulated in a DOL 
amicus brief, the DOL can effectively skirt notice and comment rulemaking procedures.
111
  This 
has become an effective and common method over the past few years for the structurally-flawed 
DOL to advance litigation that might improve its regulations for the modern workplace.
112
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 The DOL has also recently begun issuing interpretive guidance that is intended to have a 
binding effect beyond that of the individualized, fact-intensive opinion letters – Administrator 
Interpretations.
113
  Each of these documents is intended as “a general interpretation of the law 
and regulations, applicable across-the-board to all those affected by the provision in issue. 
Guidance in this form will be useful in clarifying the law as it relates to an entire industry, a 
category of employees, or to all employees.”
114
  Administrator Interpretations require more 
procedure, in that the DOL explicitly states in each opinion that the legal analysis and 
interpretation contained in the document will be broadly applicable to all regulated employers.
115
 
The issue of appropriate judicial deference only emerges where DOL opinion letters announce a  
widely applicable interpretation, as with Administrator Interpretations, or when a DOL 
interpretation could take on the force of law if adopted by a court. In the past, courts have 
afforded Auer/Seminole Rock deference to DOL interpretations of FLSA regulations.
116
  
FLSA cases like Christopher v. SmithKline illustrate the way that the DOL has recently 
attempted to use litigation and amicus briefs to secure binding interpretations of its statutes and 
regulations without having to resort to notice and comment rulemaking, which is often a 
prolonged and contentious endeavor.  The DOL developed the regular use of this tactic after the 
U.S. Supreme Court chose not to object to it in its decision in Auer, effectively opening the door 
for the DOL to create an “amicus program” through which it can solicit cases that will lead to a 
binding stamp of judicial approval for the agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation at 
issue.
117
  SmithKline is an excellent example of the DOL’s attempt to use its amicus program to 
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secure judicial deference for its interpretation of a statute where it does not appear that the DOL 
would be able to secure retroactive application of its interpretation by any other means. 
III. SmithKline and the Debate on “Over-Regulation” under the FLSA 
The FLSA and its accompanying regulations contain hundreds of exemptions, which has 
led to the classification of certain groups of employees on a case-by-case basis.  One of the “hot 
topics” in FLSA litigation over the past few years has been the classification of pharmaceutical 
sales representatives (PSRs) as “outside salesmen,”
118
 which has been a FLSA-exempt category 
of workers since 1938.
119
  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and it issued its decision in 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham on June 18, 2012.
120
 The decision resolved a split between 
the Ninth and Second Circuits, with one holding that a defendant company had properly refused 
overtime pay for PSRs by virtue of the “outside salesman” exemption, and the other holding that 
the defendant company was liable for improperly classifying the PSRs as exempt.
121
 The Court 
held in SmithKline that PSRs were properly classified as exempt “outside salesmen.”.
122
  The 
dissent, in finding no exemption, looked more to the original intent of the “outside salesman” 
exemption than to ways that it might be read to fit the realities of the PSR position. 
A. Christopher v. SmithKline  
1. Majority Opinion 
Justice Samuel Alito drafted the majority opinion in SmithKline, securing the votes of 
Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Anthony Kennedy, and Justice 
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 The two plaintiffs in the case, Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan, 
had previously worked as pharmaceutical sales representatives for SmithKline.
124
  PSRs at 
SmithKline were “responsible for calling on physicians in an assigned sales territory to discuss 
the features, benefits, and risks of an assigned portfolio of respondent's prescription drugs.”
125
 
Their main marketing goal was to obtain a nonbinding commitment from each physician stating 
that he or she would prescribe SmithKline’s drugs to his or her patients.
126
 Each PSR spent about 
40 hours each week in the field calling on physicians during normal business hours in addition to 
spending about 10 to 20 hours each week “attending events, reviewing product information, 
returning phone calls, responding to e-mails, and performing other miscellaneous tasks.”
127
 The 
Court stressed throughout the opinion that the plaintiffs were highly paid, with base salaries and 
incentive pay of over $70,000 total.
128
  
The plaintiff employees argued that they had been improperly exempted from the overtime 
provisions of the FLSA.  However, the Ninth Circuit held that SmithKline had properly applied 
the “outside salesman” exemption to their positions.  The main disagreement between the PSRs 
and their former employer as articulated in the petition for certiorari was whether or not the 
DOL’s interpretations of its own ambiguous regulations defining “outside salesman” and “sales” 
in its amicus brief should be afforded Auer deference, which the Ninth Circuit had declined to 
apply.
129
 The DOL’s regulations define “outside salesman” as an employee whose primary duty 
is “making sales” within the meaning adopted by the FLSA.
130
  The FLSA states that a “sale” 
includes “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other 
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 Id. at 2165. 
130




  Congress chose not to further define the term “outside salesman,” but it 
delegated authority to the DOL to issue regulations that would do so.
132
 
The majority affirmed the holding of the district court and the Ninth Circuit that PSRs are 
exempt under the FLSA because they are in fact “outside salesmen,” and it supported the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision not to extend Auer deference to the DOL’s interpretation of its own regulations 
defining “outside salesman” and “sales” for purposes of the exemption.
133
  In reaching this 
holding, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the DOL had itself changed its 
interpretation of the regulations defining the “outside salesman” exemption during the course of 
its involvement with both In re Novartis and SmithKline.
134
 DOL filed amicus briefs in both the 
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit expressing its view that “a ‘sale’ for the purposes of the 
outside sales exemption requires a consummated transaction directly involving the employee for 
whom the exemption is sought.”
135
  The DOL shifted its position after the Court granted 
certiorari in SmithKline, favoring the interpretation that “[a]n employee does not make a ‘sale’ . . 
. unless he actually transfers title to the property at issue.”
136
  Furthermore, the Supreme Court 




Alito wrote that the DOL's current interpretation of its regulations – the one it announced 
in its amicus brief for SmithKline at the Supreme Court level – is not entitled to Auer 
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  He attacked the DOL’s approach to interpretation in this case, writing that 
although Auer ordinarily calls for deference to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation, even when that interpretation is advanced in a legal brief, the Court does not have to 
follow this approach in all cases. One example of a case where deference is inappropriate is 
when the agency's interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” or 
when there is reason to suspect that the interpretation “does not reflect the agency's fair and 
considered judgment on the matter.”
139
 
Alito gave a searing assessment of the DOL’s approach to interpretation in this case, 
writing that “there are strong reasons for withholding” Auer deference in this case, primarily 
because allowing the PSRs to invoke the DOL's newly articulated interpretation would “impose 
potentially massive liability” on SmithKline for a decision to withhold overtime that was made 
long before the DOL announced its new interpretation of the regulations defining “outside 
salesman.”
140
 The majority felt that giving deference to the DOL's interpretation would result in 
“precisely the kind of ‘unfair surprise’” that it has long sought to prohibit under deference 
doctrines.
141
 Alito also emphasized the fact that the pharmaceutical industry had been using the 
“outside salesman” exemption for several decades to classify its PSRs, and the court had never 
instituted any type of enforcement actions against the companies until 2009, making the DOL’s 
inaction equivalent to its acquiescence.
142
 
After determining that Auer deference was unwarranted, the majority found that the 
DOL’s new interpretation, requiring an actual transfer of title to create a “sale,” was utterly 
unpersuasive under Skidmore deference because it “plainly lacks the hallmarks of thorough 
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 Given this assessment, the majority went on to do its own detailed analysis of 
the meaning of “outside salesman” as defined by DOL regulations defining the exemption.
144
 
2. Dissenting Opinion  
Justice Stephen Breyer drafted a dissenting opinion on which he was joined by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan.  Notably, the dissent does 
not discuss the majority’s unwillingness to defer to the DOL’s interpretation of its own 
regulations.
145
  Instead, the dissent embarks on its own application of the regulations interpreting 
“outside salesman” and “sales” as they relate to the FLSA exemption.  The dissent ended up at 
the opposite end of the spectrum from the majority, finding that PSRs bear no resemblance to the 
door-to-door salesmen of the 1940s who were the original workers that Congress sought to 
exempt from the FLSA’s coverage.
146
  As a result, the majority and the dissent present two 
entirely different, sui generis definitions of “outside salesman” for purposes of the FLSA.  The 
stark disagreement between the majority and the minority on the interpretation of the “outside 
salesman” regulations provides no further assistance as to how the majority decision might affect 
other categories of FLSA exemptions and DOL opinion letters or amicus briefs interpreting 
them. 
IV. Making Sense of SmithKline in Theory and Practice 
 
A. Lingering Questions from SmithKline and Its Effect on Doctrines of Judicial 
Deference 
 
 Scholars and commentators seem to be divided into two differing viewpoints on the 
larger significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in SmithKline.  The first view is that the 
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deference discussion in SmithKline is confined to the factual scenario of the case, in which the 
DOL used faulty guidance procedures in such a way that would impose mass liability on an 
important U.S. industry.
147
  The second view is that the Court’s refusal to grant Auer deference 
in SmithKline is more broadly applicable to other regulatory interpretations and suggests that the 
Court may continue to cut back on Auer and other doctrines of judicial deference, even in the 
absence of notice problems or sudden shifts in agency interpretations.
148
  Either way, SmithKline 
appears to have created far more problems than it solved for those facing or pursuing litigation. 
1. The Outside Salesman Exemption – Can the DOL Override the U.S. Supreme 
Court? 
 
 One of the initial issues left unresolved by the SmithKline decision is whether or not the 
DOL can draft its own binding guidance that prospectively defines “outside salesman” in a way 
that contradicts the analysis of the Supreme Court.  One possible outcome is that lower courts 
will view SmithKline as having little effect on Auer deference generally.  If that is the case, the 
DOL could issue its own definition of “outside salesman” through rulemaking to which lower 
courts would most likely defer under Brand X, even if it is contrary to the definition announced 
by the Court.
149
  However, Brand X stated that an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
is entitled to deference even if it contradicts a federal court’s interpretation of that statute, but 
does not consider the issue of conflicting interpretations of agency regulations.
150
  It is unclear 
whether the DOL will choose to interpret “outside salesman” directly from 29 U.S.C. § 
213(a)(1), a federal statute, or whether it will opt to interpret 29 C.F.R. § 541.500, the DOL 
regulation providing definitions to assist in the interpretation of the “outside salesman” 
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exemption.  Several circuit courts have held that Brand X deference should apply to conflicting 
interpretations of both ambiguous statues and regulations.
151
  If courts apply the reasoning of 
Brand X to any subsequent DOL interpretations of “outside salesman,” the Court’s extensive 
analysis of the term will have been a sui generis pronouncement with little lasting value.  
However, no matter which interpretive route the DOL chooses, SmithKline clearly requires that 
the DOL give employers ample notice that it plans to apply and enforce its own definition of the 
“outside salesman,” either through notice and comment rulemaking or interpretive guidance with 
substantial notice procedures.  
2. An Uncertain Future for Judicial Deference 
 
 One of the most unpredictable aspects of the SmithKline decision is whether it will have a 
broader effect on the larger body of judicial deference.  In Auer and Brand X, the U.S. Supreme 
Court greatly expanded the universe of interpretive guidance to which it would give significant 
deference, signaling to the DOL and other agencies that the Court was willing to give more 
weight to agency interpretations created outside of notice and comment rulemaking.  However, 
many commentators have suggested that the Court’s decisions in Mead and SmithKline indicate 
that the Court is moving away from the sweeping deference it embraced in the past, 
foreshadowing further restrictions of judicial deference to agency interpretation, particularly 
where the Court feels agencies are creating rules in ways that are unfair or unpredictable for 
those parties who are governed by such rules.
152
  Justice Scalia has articulated his opinion that 
Auer and Brand X may be invalid because they give unwarranted deference where Congress has 
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virtually no role or influence – in the promulgation and interpretation of agency regulations.
153
  
Scalia believes that upholding the Auer doctrine could lead agencies to create intentionally vague 
and ambiguous regulations “that they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby ‘frustrat[ing] the 
notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking.’”
154
  
 However, the Court does not explicitly write that it believes the DOL has intentionally 
drafted its “outside salesman” guidance or regulations in an ambiguous way that would allow for 
changes to its interpretations “as it sees fit.” Instead, the Court specifically refers to Auer 
deference as a “general rule” that “ordinarily calls for deference to an agency's interpretation of 
its own ambiguous regulation, even when that interpretation is advanced in a legal brief.”
155
  It 
seems unlikely that the Court intended for SmithKline to affect the doctrine of Auer deference 
outside of the factual circumstances it faced in SmithKline given its renewed endorsement of the 
doctrine as a “general rule.”  The Court seemed much more focused on reprimanding the DOL 
for abusing the Court’s holding in Auer that agencies are entitled to deference for interpretations 
articulated in amicus briefs.  
 The Court’s decision to openly rebuke the DOL in SmithKline for its use of amicus briefs 
as interpretive pronouncements seems to suggest that the Court may be reacting to some aspect 
of the DOL’s amicus briefs and their limited procedural requirements beyond the “unfair 
surprise” that the Court predicted would occur from a retroactive application of the DOL’s 
interpretation of “outside salesman.”  Interestingly, the Court does not mention the fact that the 
DOL started an amicus brief program following the election of President Barack Obama in 2008.  
This program has become an important component of the DOL’s regulatory agenda, and the 
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Court’s decision seems to be a reaction to the DOL’s conscious choice to use Auer deference in 
an attempt to secure binding judgments that adopt its interpretations.   
3. Judicial Pushback to Presidential Administration 
 One of the potential explanations for the Court’s discomfort with applying Auer 
deference to the DOL’s interpretation of its “outside salesman” regulations is the increased 
visibility of the partisan influences that shape agency policy.  It seems rather trivial for the U.S. 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the issue of how to properly define “outside salesman” for 
purposes of the FLSA, especially given the staggering amount of other contentious legal issues 
the Court chooses not to review each year.  Defining particularized statutory terms such as this 
seems to be the sort of task that the Court should feel comfortable leaving to the expertise of the 
DOL.  However, it appears the Court accepted SmithKline for review on this comparatively 
trivial issue in order to make a point to agencies regarding the propriety of hastily altering 
interpretive guidance to further a political policy agenda.  
 Some commentators have suggested that SmithKline is a direct reprimand to the Obama 
administration for failing to use adequate procedures to issue interpretive guidance designed to 
secure support from labor unions.
156
  Other commentators have also pointed out that the disputed 
interpretation in SmithKline arose directly from the DOL’s more aggressive approach to 
interpretive guidance following the transition into the Obama administration in 2008 and 
2009.
157
  While these opinions seem to come primarily from conservative, employer-friendly 
commentators, it is difficult to ignore the proliferation of amicus briefs filed by the DOL over the 
last three years.  The DOL has filed 171 briefs during that time period, which constitutes more 
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than a third of the briefs filed since 2000.  Additionally, the DOL has begun issuing guidance 
with a wider scope of applicability through its Administrator Interpretations.  This method of 
issuing interpretive guidance breaks with the decades-old custom of issuing such guidance only 
in response to individual inquires as to the applicability of statutes and regulations.  These 
actions are unprecedented steps for the DOL in terms of attempting to influence judicial review 
and secure binding effect for its “across-the-board” interpretations.  
 These steps may be the result of what Justice Elena Kagan and other legal scholars refer 
to as “presidential administration” – increased presidential use of executive branch agencies to 
advance important social and fiscal goals in an “expeditious and coherent” way without having 
to wade through a “bureaucracy that hums along on automatic pilot.”
158
 Justice Kagan argued in 
her 2001 article, Presidential Administration, that former President Bill Clinton used agencies in 
a more powerful an effective way than any president before him.
159
 Clinton was able to bypass a 
deadlocked partisan Congress by using agencies to advance many of his most important policy 
goals, including tightening environmental regulations on automobile manufacturers and 
reforming welfare.
160
  In her article, Justice Kagan called for courts to embrace the expeditious 
and efficient aspects of presidential administration by granting increased deference to 
interpretations issued by executive agencies, thereby linking deference with presidential 
involvement in agency policy and promoting the president’s role in “neglected areas of 
regulation.”
161
 Justice Kagan noted that the Chevron deference rule had its “deepest roots” in the 
idea that agencies are instruments of the President, and they are “entitled to make policy choices, 
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within the gaps left by Congress, by virtue of his relationship to the public.”
162
 Furthermore, 
Justice Kagan argued that “a focus on presidential action would reverse in many cases the courts' 
current suspicion of change in regulatory policy.”
163
 
 Conservative columnist John Fund has attacked the agenda of the DOL’s Office of the 
Solicitor, which includes an increased emphasis on amicus briefs as a method of advancing 
agency interpretations, as a blatant use of presidential administration to bypass Republican input 
in Congress.  Fund writes that “[b]ecause President Obama will now have a tough time getting 
his liberal agenda through a more Republican Congress, many Democrats are urging him to ram 
it through using the executive branch's unilateral power.” While Fund’s critique exaggerates the 
use of presidential administration as a dangerous and unchecked practice, his observations about 
Obama’s use of the DOL to advance his labor policies are accurate.  President Obama’s 
employee-centered policies are the driving force behind the DOL’s current regulatory agenda, 
although the president’s influence is not specifically mentioned.
164
 
 Perhaps one of Obama’s most visible uses of presidential administration through the 
regulatory authority of the DOL was a proposed rulemaking to extend FLSA coverage to home 
healthcare workers in 2011.
165
  This proposed revision to the FLSA regulations came directly 
from President Obama himself, signaling that he views the DOL as an important tool in 
advancing his policy goal of improving the financial outlook for low wage workers.  Many 
courts appear to be uncomfortable with the partisan nature of many of the policies that are 
advanced by presidential administration, as demonstrated by the judicial pushback against the 
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DOL’s shifting stance on the meaning of section 203(o) of the FLSA, which exempts time 
employees spend “changing clothes” from compensable work time under the FLSA.
166
  The 
Tenth Circuit held in Salazar v. Butterball that the donning and doffing of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) fell under the “changing clothes” exemption, despite a DOL Administrator 
Interpretation stating that donning and doffing PPE should not be exempt work.
167
  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court chose not to grant deference to the DOL Administrator Interpretation 
under Skidmore, writing that the interpretation had no power to persuade because the DOL had 
previously interpreted the statue to include the donning and doffing of PPE under the “changing 
clothes” exemption.
168
  A similar judicial distrust of shifting agency interpretations appears to 
have contributed to the Supreme Court’s holding in SmithKline, but this may be a trend that 
attorneys can reverse through the strategic use of deference arguments.  
B. Proposed Approaches for Attorneys Litigating FLSA Exemption Issues 
 
 In the absence of a full-scale overhaul of the FLSA itself, a solution advocated by some 
employment law scholars, the DOL must work within the confines of the FLSA as written as 
well as within the Administrative Procedure Act.  The only way for the DOL to ensure that its 
interpretations will receive Auer or Chevron deference is to conduct notice and comment 
rulemaking or draft interpretive guidance with an ample amount of notice attached.  However, 
the DOL simply does not have the resources to conduct notice and comment rulemaking on a 
regular basis. Given this reality, attorneys have an important role to play both in suggesting when 
the DOL should consider issuing guidance using additional procedures that mimic the notice and 
fairness requirements of formal rulemaking as well as in shaping the future of judicial deference. 
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1. Attorneys Should Continue to Rely on DOL Interpretations Issued with 
Procedural Fairness 
 
 Although it is not entirely clear whether lower courts will extend the reasoning of 
SmithKline to invalidate other DOL interpretations, whether issued through an opinion letters or 
amicus briefs, attorneys should continue to rely on those DOL interpretations that are not issued 
for the first time (or suddenly reversed) as a part of an ongoing lawsuit.  As discussed above, the 
DOL made an unusual move when it chose to issue a different interpretation of the regulations 
governing the “outside salesman” during the litigation of SmithKline and In re Novartis.  
Contrary to the speculative observations of some commentators, it does not appear at this time 
that SmithKline will have a broader effect on the level of deference that lower courts will apply 
to DOL interpretations of their own regulations.  Auer deference remains the “general rule,” and 
it should remain as such if parties continue to rely on DOL interpretations that “reflect the 
agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” 
2. Attorneys Should Continue to Advocate for the Application of Auer and 
Chevron Deference to DOL Interpretations 
 
 Along the same lines, attorneys and employee advocacy organizations should continue to 
argue that Auer deference remains the “general rule” for agency interpretations of their own 
regulations.  Attorneys may want to distinguish the facts of their cases from the aspects of the 
SmithKline that led the court to find that no deference was warranted, including the relevant 
timing of any DOL interpretation and any changes to the agency’s interpretation over time.  
Lower courts will be less likely to read SmithKline as limiting the ability of an agency like the 
DOL to issue interpretive guidance in the form of an amicus brief.  Chevron is also still the 
general rule for agency interpretations of the statutes they enforce, and attorneys should continue 
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to advocate for Chevron deference, especially in cases where Mead suggests that a court may 
still find that the agency used adequate procedures that merit Chevron deference under Mead.   
3. Attorneys Should Bring Issues Requiring Interpretive Guidance To the 
Attention of the DOL Administrator As Early In the Litigation Process as 
Possible 
 
 The DOL is an inherently flawed regulatory agency because it depends on the parties it 
regulates to bring possible violations and misinterpretations to its attention.  Because of this flaw, 
attorneys must be especially vigilant regarding emerging issues in wage and hour law.  For 
example, if an attorney is starting to see a number of employees at a nationally known company 
with the same complaint about being misclassified and not receiving overtime, that attorney 
needs to consult the DOL as soon as possible.  If it turns out that the employer’s classification 
decision hinges on its interpretation of an ambiguous FLSA provision or regulation, the DOL’s 
assistance is likely essential to determining the correct classification.  As SmithKline illustrates, 
the DOL’s interpretation may hurt a case if the DOL is shifting its position on a particular issue.  
While neither of these circumstances is fatal to a case individually, the combination of the two 
created a perfect storm in SmithKline.  Attorneys should attempt to avoid these situations by 
communicating with the DOL on a regular basis about new interpretive issues.  
 Another strategy for avoiding the perfect storm of shifting interpretations coupled with 
interpretations announced in amicus briefs is for attorneys to request opinion letters in 
contentious cases prior to soliciting an amicus brief from the DOL.  Some courts may be more 
suspicious of an interpretation announced in an amicus brief post-SmithKline, which may make 
opinion letters a more appealing option for those courts.  Furthermore, other amici curiae may be 
able to argue on behalf of the DOL’s interpretation where it does not have the resources to do so, 
making an opinion letter a more versatile option for use during litigation.  The DOL is 
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attempting to transition to a system of guidance based on Administrator Interpretations that are 
more broadly applicable, which may well emerge as the effective tool of interpretive guidance 
for the DOL with improved notice procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The DOL’s amicus program illustrates both the benefits and the potential downfalls 
created when an agency attempts to use amicus briefs as a method of securing binding authority 
for its interpretive guidance. Unfortunately for the DOL, its amicus program appears to be a 
problematic and unpredictable way for the agency to guide employers, employees, and attorneys 
through the regulatory jumble of the FLSA.  The DOL is experimenting with its opinion letters, 
expanding their scope and transforming them into the kind of well-reasoned, widely 
disseminated interpretation the Supreme Court was searching for in SmithKline.  Administrator 
Interpretations are the future of DOL regulatory guidance, and as such, the DOL needs to ensure 
that it issues such Interpretations using procedures that will hold up under an analysis of Auer 
deference.  Barring any major overhaul of the way the DOL does business, attorneys must find a 
way to ensure that the DOL is adequately informed of situations where large numbers of workers 
may be affected by misclassification under FLSA exemptions.  Attorneys must continue to 
advocate for substantial deference in situations where it is warranted, but also recognize when 
DOL involvement in an interpretation may do more harm than good.  SmithKline has thrown a 
wrench into a line of cases suggesting that agencies can use amicus briefs to announce 
interpretive guidance regarding their own regulations, but it has not shut the door on strategic 
advocacy.  The DOL and attorneys alike must continue to navigate the tangled exemptions of the 
FLSA, but hopefully SmithKline will serve as an important reminder that notice and procedure 
must accompany any attempt to interpret the FLSA in the modern workplace.    
